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Terrance Bortell v. Vermont Composites Inc. (March 25, 2011)

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Terrance Bortell v. Vermont Composites Inc. (March 25, 2011)
STATE OF VERMONT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Terrance Bortell Opinion No. 37L-10WC
v. By: Phyllis Phillips, Esq.
Hearing Officer
Vermont Composites, Inc.
For: Anne M. Noonan
Commissioner
State File No. X-02179
RULING ON CLAIMANT’S MOTION TO ORDER LUMP SUM PAYMENT OF PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY BENEFITS AND FOR OTHER RELIEF
The Commissioner previously decided this claim on December 30, 2010. The opinion determined that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled, and ordered that permanent total disability benefits be paid in accordance with 21 V.S.A. §645 commencing on November 10, 2008 (with credit for any permanent partial disability benefits paid since that date).
Claimant now requests that the minimum amount payable under §645(a) – 330 weeks at the applicable compensation rate – be paid in a lump sum in accordance with 21 V.S.A. §652(b), so that the benefits can be prorated in accordance with 21 V.S.A. §652(c). The purpose of the latter section is to protect a claimant’s ongoing entitlement to Social Security benefits by minimizing the offset that otherwise would occur were workers’ compensation permanency benefits not prorated over his or her life expectancy.
In keeping with §652(b), Workers’ Compensation Rule 19.3000 allows the commissioner to approve a claimant’s request for lump sum payment of permanent disability compensation “if it is in the best interests of the claimant.” The rule lists four “positive factors” to be considered in evaluating such a request:
19.3010 The claimant and/or the claimant’s household receives a regular source of income aside from any workers’ compensation benefit;
19.3011 The lump sum payment is intended to hasten or improve claimant’s prospects of returning to gainful employment;
19.3012 The lump sum payment is intended to hasten or improve claimant’s recovery or rehabilitation;
19.3013 The claimant presents other evidence that the lump sum award is in their best interests.
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Workers’ Compensation Rule 19.5000 states that a lump sum payment shall not be approved if:
19.5010 The award was based upon a hearing decision for which an appeal has been filed and the employer or insurer objects to the payment of the lump sum; or
19.5011 The claimant is best served by receipt of periodic income benefits; or
19.5012 The payment is intended to pay everyday living expenses; or
19.5013 The lump sum payment is intended to pay past debts.
It is notable that while the language of Rule 19.5000 is mandatory, prohibiting a lump sum award if any of the four enumerated circumstances exist, the language of Rule 19.3000 is discretionary, in which the four enumerated circumstances are merely “positive factors” to be considered.
In support of his request here, Claimant asserts that since he began receiving permanency compensation his monthly Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) benefit has been reduced. Claimant’s SSDI benefit represents a regular source of household income under Rule 19.3010, and it is in his best interests to maximize his income from that source. On those grounds, I conclude that there is good reason to approve the payment of the first 330 weeks of Claimant’s permanent total disability award in a lump sum.
I further conclude that there is no basis under Rule 19.5000 for rejecting Claimant’s request. Defendant has not appealed the formal hearing decision, and the appeal period has now run. Claimant is better served not by the receipt of periodic income benefits from workers’ compensation, but by the maximization of his income from Social Security Disability. The lump sum payment is not intended to pay everyday living expenses, as Claimant’s Social Security Disability income will be adequate for that purpose. Last, although Claimant has had to borrow money in order to cover some additional expenses he just recently incurred, these were due to unusual and extenuating circumstances, and I do not consider them to be the type of “past debts” envisioned by the rule.
As a final argument, Defendant claims that it will be prejudiced if it is required to pay benefits in a lump sum. Given that Claimant has admitted in the past to suicidal ideation, Defendant argues that it “may have difficulty” recouping the lump sum payment if Claimant dies. Suffice it to say that nothing in Rule 19 even remotely hints at such reasoning as a valid basis for denying a lump sum request.
I conclude that it is appropriate under the circumstances of this case to award Claimant the first 330 weeks of permanent total disability benefits in a lump sum. Contrary to Claimant’s request, however, I will not assess interest or penalties against Defendant for its failure to issue a lump sum payment voluntarily. Absent an order to do so from the Commissioner, Defendant was under no obligation to pay benefits in a lump sum. There is no basis, therefore, for assessing either interest or penalties.
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Defendant is reminded, however, that it is its responsibility, not Claimant’s, to ensure that all outstanding medical bills causally related to the compensable injury are timely paid. To the extent that this has not occurred, Defendant may be liable for interest as charged by the providers.
Claimant having prevailed on his request for a lump sum award, he is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees. Claimant has submitted two requests for attorney fees, one in conjunction with his original motion and a cumulative one filed after his reply to Defendant’s memorandum in opposition. Considering both submissions together, I conclude that an award of fees totaling $2,392.50 (16.5 hours at $145.00 per hour) is appropriate.
As for costs, Claimant shall have 30 days from the date of this Order within which to submit his request for reimbursement.
ORDER:
Based on the foregoing, Defendant is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendant shall pay as a lump sum 330 weeks of permanent total disability benefits in accordance with 21 V.S.A. §645 commencing on November 10, 2008 (with credit for any permanent partial and/or permanent total disability benefits paid to date);
2. The award of benefits in this case, totaling $144,332.20, is lump sum compensation for a permanent impairment that will affect Claimant for the rest of his life. Claimant’s remaining life expectancy, based on the National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 54, No. 14 (April 19, 2006), is 33.1 years, or 397.2 months. Therefore, even though paid in a lump sum, Claimant’s net benefit is $88,950.60 (after the Commissioner’s award of $21,978.92 for attorney fees and deduction of attorney fees of $55,381.60 from the total award), which shall be prorated pursuant to 21 V.S.A. §652 and considered to be $223.94 per month beginning on November 10, 2008;
3. Attorney fees totaling $2,392.50 and costs to be submitted.
DATED at Montpelier, Vermont this 25th day of March 2011.
_____________________
Anne M. Noonan
Commissioner
Appeal:
Within 30 days after copies of this opinion have been mailed, either party may appeal questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact to a superior court or questions of law to the Vermont Supreme Court. 21 V.S.A. §§670, 672.

William Boyd v. Kennametal Inc. (December 29, 2010

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William Boyd v. Kennametal Inc. (December 29, 2010)
STATE OF VERMONT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
William Boyd Opinion No. 33S-10WC
v. By: Phyllis Phillips, Esq.
Hearing Officer
Kennametal, Inc.
For: Valerie Rickert
Acting Commissioner
State File No. S-14574
RULING ON CLAIMANT’S MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER FOR LUMP SUM PAYMENT
The Commissioner previously decided this claim on November 10, 2010. The opinion determined that Claimant was permanently and totally disabled, and ordered that permanent total disability benefits be paid in accordance with 21 V.S.A. §645 commencing on May 18, 2008 (with credit for any permanent partial disability benefits paid since that date).
Claimant now requests that the minimum amount payable under §645(a) – 330 weeks at the applicable compensation rate – be paid in a lump sum in accordance with 21 V.S.A. §652(b), and prorated in accordance with 21 V.S.A. §652(c). The purpose of the latter section is to protect a claimant’s ongoing entitlement to Social Security benefits by minimizing the offset that otherwise would occur were workers’ compensation permanency benefits not prorated over his or her life expectancy.
In keeping with §652(b), Workers’ Compensation Rule 19.3000 allows the commissioner to approve a claimant’s request for lump sum payment of permanent disability compensation “if it is in the best interests of the claimant.” The rule lists four “positive factors” to be considered in evaluating such a request:
19.3010 The claimant and/or the claimant’s household receives a regular source of income aside from any workers’ compensation benefit;
19.3011 The lump sum payment is intended to hasten or improve claimant’s prospects of returning to gainful employment;
19.3012 The lump sum payment is intended to hasten or improve claimant’s recovery or rehabilitation;
19.3013 The claimant presents other evidence that the lump sum award is in their best interests.
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Workers’ Compensation Rule 19.5000 states that a lump sum payment shall not be approved if:
19.5010 The award was based upon a hearing decision for which an appeal has been filed and the employer or insurer objects to the payment of the lump sum; or
19.5011 The claimant is best served by receipt of periodic income benefits; or
19.5012 The payment is intended to pay everyday living expenses; or
19.5013 The lump sum payment is intended to pay past debts.
It is notable that while the language of Rule 19.5000 is mandatory, prohibiting a lump sum award if any of the four enumerated circumstances exist, the language of Rule 19.3000 is discretionary, in which the four enumerated circumstances are merely “positive factors” to be considered.
In support of his request here, Claimant asserts that since he began receiving permanency compensation his monthly Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) benefit has been reduced. Claimant’s SSDI benefit represents a regular source of household income under Rule 19.3010, and it is in his best interests to maximize his income from that source. On those grounds, I conclude that there is good reason to approve the payment of the first 330 weeks of Claimant’s permanent total disability award in a lump sum.1
I further conclude that there is no basis under Rule 19.5000 for rejecting Claimant’s request. Defendant has not appealed the formal hearing decision, and the appeal period has now run. Claimant is better served not by the receipt of periodic income benefits from workers’ compensation, but by the maximization of his income from Social Security Disability. Neither party asserts that the proposed lump sum is intended to pay either everyday expenses or past debts.
1 Having concluded that Claimant’s SSDI benefit constitutes a regular source of alternative household income sufficient to satisfy Rule 19.3010, there is no need to consider the factual issues Defendant has raised as to whether Claimant’s spouse is or is not regularly supplying additional household income so as to provide even further support for the request.
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ORDER:
Based on the foregoing, Defendant is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendant shall pay as a lump sum 330 weeks of permanent total disability benefits in accordance with 21 V.S.A. §645 commencing on May 18, 2008 (with credit for any permanent partial disability benefits paid to date);
2. The award of benefits in this case, totaling $239,085.41, is lump sum compensation for a permanent impairment that will affect Claimant for the rest of his life. Claimant’s remaining life expectancy, based on the National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 54, No. 14 (April 19, 2006), is 36.3 years, or 435.6 months. Therefore, even though paid in a lump sum, Claimant’s net benefit is $189,336.68 (after the Commissioner’s award of $13,363.50 for attorney fees and deduction of attorney fees of $63,112.23 from the total award), which shall be considered to be $434.66 per month beginning on May 18, 2008.
DATED at Montpelier, Vermont this 29th day of December 2010.
____________________
Valerie Rickert
Acting Commissioner
Appeal:
Within 30 days after copies of this opinion have been mailed, either party may appeal questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact to a superior court or questions of law to the Vermont Supreme Court. 21 V.S.A. §§670, 672.

R. C. v. Consolidated Memorials, Inc. (January 2, 2007)

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R. C. v. Consolidated Memorials, Inc. (January 2, 2007)
STATE OF VERMONT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
R. C. Opinion No. 54-06WC
By: Margaret A. Mangan
v. Hearing Officer
Consolidated Memorials, Inc. For: Patricia Moulton Powden
Commissioner
State File No. W-03620
Hearing held in Montpelier on September 12, 2006
Record closed on October 17, 2006
APPEARANCES:
Heidi S. Groff Esq., for the Claimant
Joseph M. Lorman Esq., for the Defendant
ISSUES:
1. Did the Claimant sustain an April 2004 work injury that caused an infection, which led to the amputation of both legs above the ankles, resulting in permanent total disability?
2. Is the Claimant entitled to thirteen weeks of temporary total disability benefits?
3. If entitled to a workers’ compensation award, may the Claimant receive a lump sum payment of benefits?
EXHIBITS:
Joint Exhibit No. I: Medical Records on CD
Claimant’s 1: C.V. of Ernest Atlas, M.D.
Defendant’s A: C.V. of Philip Carling, M.D.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The Claimant was an employee within the meaning of the Vermont Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) for all relevant periods.
2. The Defendant was an employer within the meaning of the Act for all relevant time periods.
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3. By April 2004, the Claimant was working roughly sixty hours per week as the General Manager of Consolidated Memorials.
4. As General Manager, the Claimant chipped granite with a chisel and handset, used a saw, drove trucks, placed orders for materials, and performed other similar tasks.
5. The Claimant wore gloves to perform these tasks only when it was cold.
6. The Claimant always had cuts on his hands and arms from working with sharp granite.
7. On April 5, 2004, the Claimant cut and scraped his hands and arms while chipping granite with a chisel and handset. Some of these injuries bled. The Claimant was familiar with the first aid kit and used antibiotic ointment and bandages.
8. On April 9, 2004, the Claimant was performing his duties as General Manager. While at work, the Claimant suddenly became nauseated and began vomiting.
9. Later that day, the Claimant’s wife came home to find the Claimant lying on the couch, shivering and wrapped in blankets. The Claimant was vomiting with chest pain and diarrhea.
10. That evening, the Claimant’s was treated at the Central Vermont Hospital’s Emergency room, where he was diagnosed with influenza and pulled chest muscles. Upon release, the Claimant was given medication and was instructed to return if his symptoms worsened.
11. The Claimant’s symptoms continued throughout the night and into the following morning.
12. On April 10, 2004, the Claimant continued to experience nausea, vomiting, diarrhea, and chest pain. Additionally, the abrasions on the Claimant’s hands and arms began to feel very itchy. The Claimant requested that his wife scratch these abrasions.
13. Upon scratching the Claimant’s hands and arms, the Claimant’s wife noticed that a cut on the Claimant’s right pinky finger had opened and was exuding puss. She treated this wound with peroxide, triple antibiotic ointment, and a band-aid. She also noticed other scratches and abrasions on the Claimant’s hands and arms.
14. At approximately 10 PM on April 10, 2004, the Claimant was admitted to the Central Vermont Hospital because of his worrisome and persistent symptoms.
15. In the early morning hours on April 11, 2004 the Claimant’s vital signs continued dropping. As a result, he was admitted to the Intensive Care Unit and given intravenous fluids.
16. The April 11, 2004 medical records show that the Claimant had multiple sores on his hands from work related trauma. These records also note that one of the sores “had a
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pustule that was I&D’d by the wife yesterday.” The records then state that the sores appeared to be healing with no active discharge.
17. A stool sample taken that day at the Central Vermont Hospital tested positive for a few colonies of Group A Streptococcus.
18. Later that morning, the Claimant’s condition continued to worsen until he was in a state of septic shock. At this time he was transported by helicopter to Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center (DMHC).
19. The Claimant became comatose as a result of his severe illness.
20. Also on April 11, 2004, a DMHC CT scan found that the Claimant’s terminal ileum, cecum, and ascending colon were moderately thick-walled. The differential diagnosis of this condition included “typhilitis, Crohn’s disease, lymphoma, infectious etiology such as Giardia; ischemia less likely without supporting clinical evidence such as acidemia.”
21. On April 12, 2004, a paronychia, infection in the tissue surrounding the nail bed, on the Claimant’s right thumb tested positive for Group A Streptococcus.
22. By April 13, 2004, the Group A Streptococcus was found in the Claimant’s bloodstream and urine.
23. DHMC repeatedly tested the Claimant’s stool for the presence of white blood cells. These tests were all negative.
24. The doctors at DHMC found inflamed and necrotic tissue along the Claimant’s left chest wall.
25. As a result of complications from the septic shock, the Claimant’s lower extremities became gangrenous. This condition led to bilateral, below the knee amputations of the Claimant’s legs.
26. Beginning on April 12, 2004, the Claimant was out of work for a total of thirteen weeks as a result of this experience.
27. On July 12, 2004, the Claimant returned to work as a General Manager at Consolidated Memorials.
28. The Claimant is requesting TTD compensation for the recovery period from April 12, 2004 through July 11, 2004.
29. The Claimant is requesting attorney fees and costs. Claimant’s Counsel has a 25% Fee Agreement with the Claimant and an approved Attorney Lien. The Claimant has included an itemized list of litigation costs totaling $5,762.54.
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Medical Testimony
Ernest Atlas, M.D.
30. Dr. Atlas is an expert in infectious diseases and has been practicing for over thirty years. He regularly consults in infectious disease cases and has personally treated over a dozen cases involving Group A Streptococcus.
31. After reviewing the Claimant’s medical records, the Claimant’s wife’s deposition testimony, and interviewing the Claimant’s wife, Dr. Atlas opined that the Group A Streptococcus entered the Claimant’s body via the work related cuts and abrasions.
32. From there, Dr. Atlas believes that the bacteria spread through the Claimant’s bloodstream to the deep tissue of the left chest wall, where it produced a necrotizing fasciitis and septic shock. This condition caused blood clotting in the small vessels of the Claimant’s legs and gangrene. The septic shock also resulted in decreased blood flow and the need for vasoconstrictor medications. As a result of these factors, below the knee amputations of the Claimant’s legs were required.
33. Dr. Atlas explained that a superficial scratch or abrasion is likely to heal quickly once pus is exuded, even if this was the initial source of the Group A Streptococcus infection.
34. Dr. Atlas stated that the vast majority of Group A Streptococcus infections originate from breaks in the skin. He also stated that once this infection enters the bloodstream, the bacteria can circulate throughout the body.
35. While not impossible, in over thirty years of infectious disease practice Dr. Atlas had never seen, read about, or heard of Group A Streptococcus entering the body through the bowel.
36. Dr. Atlas opined that if this type of infection were to begin in the bowel then the stool would have had heavy growth of Group A Streptococcus and a high white blood cell count.
Philip C. Carling, M.D.
37. Dr. Carling has specialized in infectious disease medicine for over thirty years. However, he does not have first hand experience treating patients with Group A Streptococcus resulting in necrotizing fasciitis.
38. After reviewing the Claimant’s complete medical records, witness depositions, and medical reports, Dr. Carling opined that the work related scratches and abrasions were not the most likely source of the Group A Streptococcus.
39. Rather, Dr. Carling believed that the primary infection developed in the Claimant’s terminal ileum and ascending colon. This infection led to overwhelming streptococcal sepsis, organ failure, and the need for a bilateral leg amputation.
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40. Dr. Carling believed that the presence of a “few” colonies of Group A Strep showed that the bowel was the primary site of the infection.
41. Dr. Carling opined that the Claimant’s right thumb tested positive for Group A Streptococcus because the thumb came in contact with infected stool.
42. Dr. Carling agreed that gastrointestinal symptoms can be a result of the sepsis, no matter where the source of the infection is.
43. Dr. Carling could not recall any examples of cases, or any literature where Group A Streptococcus entered the body via the bowel.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. In workers’ compensation cases, the claimant has the burden of establishing all facts essential to the rights asserted. Goodwin v. Fairbanks, 123 Vt. 161 (1962). The claimant must establish by sufficient credible evidence the character and extent of the injury and disability as well as the causal connection between the injury and the employment. Egbert v. Book Press, 144 Vt. 367 (1984).
2. To qualify for workers’ compensation benefits, the personal injury must arise out of and in the course of employment. See 21 V.S.A. § 618 (a)(1).
3. In Vermont, a worker who is injured at work may collect temporary disability benefits depending upon his actual capacity to work during the period that he is healing, until such time as he or she reaches maximum medical improvement. Hepburn v. Concrete Professionals, Inc./Traveler’s Insurance Co., Opinion No. 16-03WC (2003).; 21 V.S.A § 642.
4. A Claimant is entitled to temporary total disability benefits under 21 V.S.A. § 642, while either: (1) in the healing period and not yet at a maximum medical improvement, Orvis v. Hutchins, 123 Vt. 18 (1962), or (2) unable as a result of the injury either to resume the former occupation or to procure remunerative employment at a different occupation suited to the impaired capacity. Roller v. Warren, 98 Vt. 514 (1925); Votra v. Mack Molding, Inc. Opinion No. 44-02WC (2002).
5. Under 21 V.S.A. § 644(a)(2), a Claimant is entitled to at least 330 weeks of permanent total disability if the work related injury causes the loss of both feet at or above the ankle.
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6. There must be created in the mind of the trier of fact something more than a possibility, suspicion or surmise that the incidents complained of were the cause of the injury and the inference from the facts proved must be the more probable hypothesis. Burton Holden & Martin Lumber Co., 112 Vt. 17 1941. Where the causal connection between an accident and an injury is obscure, and a layperson would have no well-grounded opinion as to causation, expert medical testimony is necessary. J.G. v. Eden Park Nursing Home, Opinion No. 52-05WC (2005) (citing Lapan v. Berno’s Inc., 137 Vt. 393 (1979)).
7. When qualified medical expert opinions are in conflict, this Department has traditionally examined the following criteria: 1) the length of time the physician has provided care to the claimant; 2) the physician’s qualifications, including the degree of professional training and experience; 3) the objective support for the opinion; and 4) the comprehensiveness of the respective examinations, including whether the expert had all the relevant records. J.C. v. Richburg Builders. Opinion No. 37-06WC (2006). (citing Miller v. Cornwall Orchards, Opinion No. 20-97WC (1997); Gardner v. Grand Union, Opinion No. 24-97WC (1997)).
8. The medical experts in this case were both highly qualified infectious disease experts. Neither physician provided treatment to the Claimant. Rather, both doctors relied on the Claimant’s medical records, depositions, and their own extensive training and experience when rendering their expert medical opinions. As a result, the fact that Dr. Atlas has personal experience in treating patients with similar Group A Streptococcal infections lends greater weight to his opinion.
9. Dr. Atlas testified that Group A Streptococcal bacteria most often enters the body via a break in the skin. The Claimant had multiple work related cuts and abrasions on his arms and hands at the onset of his illness. The Claimant’s medical records document signs of infection on two of these wounds, one testing positive for the infectious bacterium.
10. By contrast, neither expert could recall any case they had ever worked on, read about, or even heard of where the bowel was the point of origin for a Group A Strep infection. Furthermore, while a CT scan showed moderate thickening of the bowel wall, none of the DMHC physicians connected this finding with the Claimant’s sepsis or took further action.
11. Furthermore, Dr. Atlas stated that if the bowel were the primary infection site then the Claimant’s stool would have been teeming with white blood cells and bacterial colonies. Instead, white blood cells were absent each time the Claimant’s stool was tested. Rather than finding a heavy concentration of bacterial colonies, the stool contained only a few colonies that were likely deposited via the Claimant’s bloodstream.
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12. Hence, the April 2004 work related injuries sustained by the Claimant caused the above infection and complications leading to a bilateral leg amputation. This is a scheduled injury under 21 V.S.A. § 644(a)(2); therefore, the Claimant is entitled to at least 330 weeks of permanent total disability.
13. Furthermore, from April 12, 2004 through July 11, 2004, the Claimant was recovering from complications resulting from his work related injury, unable to work and had not yet reached medical end result. As such, the Claimant is also entitled to TTD benefits for this thirteen-week period.
14. Based on 21 V.S.A. § 678(a) and Rule 10, Claimant is awarded Attorney fees of 20% of the total award or $9,000, whichever is less.
Lump Sum Payment
15. In 2000, the legislature amended 21 V.S.A. § 652(b) to permit a Claimant to request an award payment in one lump sum. Sanz v. Douglas Collins Const., ¶ 6, 2006 Vt. 102. The Commissioner will grant this request if it is in the best interest of the Claimant or his family. Id.
16. The Department considers the following factors when determining whether a lump sum payment is in the best interest of a claimant. The claimant and/or the claimant’s household receives a regular source of income aside from any workers’ compensation benefit, the lump sum payment is intended to hasten or improve claimant’s prospects of returning to gainful employment or the lump sum payment is intended to hasten or improve claimant’s recovery or rehabilitation; the claimant presents other evidence that the lump sum award is in their best interests. Patch v. H.P. Cummings Const., Opinion No. 49-02WC (2002); Rule 19.5000.
17. A lump sum payment will not be awarded if: the award was based upon a hearing decision for which an appeal has been filed and the employer or insurer objects to the payment of the lump sum; or the claimant is best served by receipt of periodic income benefits; or the payment is intended to pay everyday living expenses; or the lump sum payment is intended to pay past debts. Id.
18. In the present case, this Claimant has returned to work, earning regular income outside of any workers’ compensation award. Therefore, the Claimant need not rely on the periodic payment of benefits for everyday expenses. As such, the Department recognizes that a lump sum award is in the best interest of this Claimant.
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ORDER:
THEREFORE, based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Claimant’s claim is compensible and the Defendant is ORDERED to pay:
1. Related Medical Benefits;
2. TTD benefits from April 12, 2004 through July 11, 2004;
3. A lump sum payment of PTD, pursuant to 21 V.S.A. § 644(a)(2), for at least 330 weeks;
4. Statutory interest from the date the ordered benefits should have been paid had this case been accepted, pursuant to 21 V.S.A. §664;
5. Attorney fees of 20% of the total award or $9,000, whichever is less.
Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this ____ day of December 2006.
___________________________
Patricia Moulton Powden
Commissioner
Appeal:
Within 30 days after copies of this opinion have been mailed, either party may appeal questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact to a superior court or questions of law to the Vermont Supreme Court. 21 V.S.A. §§ 670, 672.

Scott Davis v. Wal-Mart (July 20, 2012)

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Scott Davis v. Wal-Mart (July 20, 2012)
STATE OF VERMONT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Scott Davis Opinion No. 14S-12WC
v. By: Jane Woodruff, Esq.
Hearing Officer
Wal-Mart
For: Anne M. Noonan
Commissioner
State File No. Z-52910
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER
The Commissioner’s Opinion and Order in this claim issued on May 16, 2012. In accordance with that Order, Defendant issued a lump sum payment to Claimant in the amount of $59,237.76, calculated as follows: (1) permanent partial disability compensation totaling $37,612.58; (2) interest totaling $11,599.10; (3) reimbursable litigation costs totaling $4,735.13; and (4) attorney fees totaling $5,290.95.
The lump sum so paid is compensation for permanent impairment that will affect Claimant for the rest of his life. Claimant’s remaining life expectancy according to National Vital Statistics Reports, Vol. 54, No. 14(April 19, 2006), is 47 years or 564 months. Therefore, even though paid in a lump sum, Claimant’s net payment of $32,137.59 (after deduction of attorney fees of $18,167.54 and expenses of $8,932.63) shall be considered to be $56.98 per month beginning on the date of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
DATED at Montpelier, Vermont this 20th day of July 2012.
_______________________
Anne M. Noonan
Commissioner
Appeal:
Within 30 days after copies of this opinion have been mailed, either party may appeal questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact to a superior court or questions of law to the Vermont Supreme Court. 21 V.S.A. §§ 670, 672.

 J. B. v. Steven Betit (September 26, 2008)

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J. B. v. Steven Betit (September 26, 2008)
STATE OF VERMONT
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
J. B. Opinion No. 32V-08WC
v. By: Phyllis G. Phillips, Esq.
Hearing Officer
Steven Betit
For: Patricia Moulton Powden
Commissioner
State File No. Y-51024
RULING ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO VACATE
Defendant moves to vacate the Commissioner’s Amended Order, in which Claimant was awarded benefits in a lump sum with the appropriate social security offset language required by 21 V.S.A. §652(c). Defendant contends that it was not served properly with Claimant’s Motion to Amend, that the issue was not tried at the formal hearing and that no evidence was presented upon which to base the amended Order.
In response to Defendant’s motion, Claimant has submitted his attorney’s affidavit documenting that the Motion to Amend was in fact properly served on Defendant. Claimant also notes that he included a request for payment in a lump sum in his original proposed findings, and referred to the social security offset issue as the basis for concluding that a lump sum payment was in his and his family’s best interests.
According to 21 V.S.A. §652(b), upon application of the employee the commissioner may authorize payment of permanency benefits in a lump sum if she finds it to be in the best interest of the employee or the employee’s dependents to do so. Notably, the statute does not give the employer any voice in this matter.
I find that it was proper to accept Claimant’s proposed findings as to the basis for his lump sum request. I further find that Claimant’s Motion to Amend was properly served on Defendant. Defendant’s Motion to Vacate is DENIED.
DATED at Montpelier, Vermont this 26th day of September 2008.
__________________________
Patricia Moulton Powden
Commissioner

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